fraud – Andreae.com

The challenge of voice recognition and the need for multiple modalities to the question of authentication

A Good Mimic Can Bypass Voice Recognition Authentication, Research Suggests

The idea of voice many see as one of the more interesting biometric solutions as seen from an ergonomic perspective and something that can readily enhance the call center consumer experience and related security. The user simply needs to say something into a microphone (telephone) and presto they can be identified or authenticated.

But is it a safe and secure approach or simply the starting point for the identification and therefore associated with additional authentication processes.

Personally I am not convinced a voice is a good solution to the challenge of authentication. Yes, as one element of a multi-factor multimodal approach it is an excellent modality. But not as the only biometric modality. My fear emerged from a conversation with a sound engineer. She told me they could, at the level of a single vowel, splice and change the intonation of a word in a movie sound track.

The above article clearly identifies real world examples of voice biometrics being fooled and concludes by remind us that a multimodal solution is essential.

Classic Multi-Factor Authentication wants to pair multiple unique and none replicable elements together.

Some thing you have
Some thing you know
Something you are

When I think about multi-factor authentication I wonder what would happen if the object “what you have” can be stolen. This therefore means the second factor must to assure that only the legitimate user is presenting the object. If a mime can replicate a voice, after stealing the object, then, this combination of factors can be compromised.

EMV, when implemented as Chip and PIN, matches a unique chip card (what you have) with a PIN (what you know). Apple Pay is EMV and stores the secrets and executes the cryptographic functions, inside hardware, the Secure Enclave (what you have) and combines this with a sensor to capture the Biometric (what you are). The electronic passport ICAO use similar chips and carries within it a facial image. The US PIV & CAC cards uses the same style Chip and are paired it with a fingerprint and sometimes also requires the user to enter their PIN.

Yet are they truly secure? We know Apple X’s, facial recognition, as currently implemented, can be fooled. We know that Touch ID was spoofed. Without liveness testing, most if not all biometrics, will accept a clone or replica of the biometric it employs.

The challenge is establishing the appropriate benchmarks for the various biometric implementations such that enterprises, governments, merchants and corporations can select and implement a consumer experience that satisfies the needs of security and convenience.

Acronyms like FRR, FAR and PAD become critical to selecting the appropriate implementation of a biometric solution.

The False Reject Rate or FRR is all about convenience and not refusing the legitimate user. Perfection is a ratio of 0 in ∞
The False Accept Rate or FAR is all about not approving a transaction or event by an imposter. Perfection is a ratio of 0 in 1
The Presentation Attack Detection or PAD is all about addressing the reality that anything can be duplicated; therefore it is essential to make sure the biometric presented in alive and genuine. Perfection is a ratio of 0 in 1.

The challenge is establishing a balance between the cost and the acceptable FRR, FAR and PAD.

Measuring and establishing the test results of a particular element of a multi-factor solution is not cheap. EMV, PIV, ICAO software and “Secure enclave” / “Chip Card” / “Secure Element” suppliers spend 100’s of thousands of dollars developing and certifying the functional and security characteristics of the “what you have” element of these solutions. We know that passwords and PIN can and have been compromised with Phishing attacks and hidden cameras.

When we think about biometrics there is complexity in the read and match processes. When the user established their identity and their biometric the reference template is create. This reference template is then used in the matching process to identify if template resulting from the biometric just presented, is the same. Unfortunately reality dictates that each presentation of the user’s biometric will generate a unique result. This unique result will never absolutely match the reference template. Hence the need to understand and test the sensor and establish its FRR, FAR and PAD. The more foolproof the match must be, dictates the complexity of the solution and the number of different individual needed during the test process to establish the sensors FRR, FAR and PAD.

Therefore selecting the most appropriate solutions means quantify the risk of the event or transaction and measuring it against the cost and certified characteristics of the authentication mechanisms.

A layered approach that combines two or more factors must also considered including multiple modalities for at least the “what you are modality” is what we must consider. Using cryptography and hardware to address what you are, Passwords and demographic information to match what you know and layering various elements like location, behavior and some set of biometrics to understand who you are, will offer the highest level of security with the lowest degree of inconvenience.

Bottom Line Multi-Modal & Multi Factor

Authentication of Identification is what we must implement

Always mindful a modality will lose its ability to assure uniqueness

Over time.

Tokenization and the search for Identification and Authentication

These two words began to fascinate me as I began to understand the value of cryptography while working through the goals we established when developing EMV and attempted to secure the payment credentials when used on the Internet.

With EMV we were trying to address the challenge of the fraud (an issuer cost) resulting from the ease of counterfeiting the token of the token which was a token of a token already.

This last broken token is the magnetic stripe on the payment card.

The payment card, in and of itself, is a token. An instrument imbued with physical security features e.g. the hologram and signature panel. Security features the merchant is supposed to check when attempting to allow a buyer, the consumer, to use the payment credential associated with the card to make payment for good and services.

The PAN is just a unique number, another token. This unique number is simply the index, The identifier within the payment credentials, which associates the payment with the underlining source of funds.

The source of funds, the PAN or Token pointing to, is then either a line of credit, prepaid balance or bank account.

The card, the hologram, the magnetic stripe and the printed security features and the PAN had reached the end of their useful life, as security features or tokens. The criminal knew how to compromise the card and associated static data.

As we entered the 90’s, the card as the carrier of the payment credential, with those physical security features, was longer a means of Authentication. These layers of authentication had been compromised. In other words the token was broken!

To address this concern, in 1993 the founders of EMV embraced the chip card and its Cryptographic capabilities. In particular, the use of symmetric and asymmetric algorithms to provide a new set of tokens the merchants (asymmetric) and Issuer (symmetric) could use to Authenticate the unique carrier of the payment credential – the token – the chip card.

On the Internet the challenge is different. The physical features of the card are not easily accessible, hence useless. In 1993, when WWW became the thing of conferences, everyone said lets think of the internet in the same way we allow merchants to sell stuff via mail and telephone. Everyone simply decided and agreed to exploit the acceptance rules agreed on for those other virtual environment, the phone and the mail.

Bottom line, in the world of mail order / telephone order and now a browser; merchant simply agrees to accept the cost of fraud, given the CARD is NOT PRESENT. Worse still how do they prove the right cardholder in present?. For the merchant, given the potential of the Internet, it is was a small price to pay.

Everyone simply accepted that be capturing the data embossed on the front (PAN, expiry date and cardholder name) and the CVV printed on the back of the card and, in some cases, using the power of AVS “Address Verification Service” a modicum of security could be factored in. At least for a time!

SET “Secure Electronic Transactions”, a cryptographic mechanism Visa and MasterCard cooked up, was developed circa 1995-1996 and deployment was attempted. The challenge, the limitations of the then deployed technologies and the inability to provide a reasonably convenient user interface. The problem begins with loading payment credentials into the browser and more importantly figuring out how to use them when shopping.

A set of great ideas foiled by convenience.

Next came 3D-Secure, an invention of Visa. This time the idea was to exploit the power of passwords and secret questions to authenticate the user.

Nice idea, well thought out; but, unfortunately not designed with the consumer in mind.

Another feeble failed attempt to develop a mechanism to authenticate the buyer. Or better put, solve the dilemma the New Yorker so aptly described

“On the Internet nobody knows your a dog”.

All this begs the question – how will we secure payments on the Internet?

3D-Secure 2.0, maybe? Or maybe W3C and the FIDO Alliance have the answer in what is called WebAuthN.

To address this question we must begin by defining the problem.

When we think about payments and we think about shopping on the internet it is all about someone or something {read issuer} agreeing that the consumer will make good on the promise to pay and therefore the issuer is willing to guarantee payment towards the merchant. The challenge, how do we confirm it is the legitimate person seeking to pay with their means of payment.

In other spheres of endeavour it’s about granting access to someplace or some website. In the physical world we have a key that we can insert into the lock or a security device {card} we can insert or tap on a reader programmed to recognize our credential and allow us access.

On the Internet, the use of a physical card with physical security features, numbers, letters, and a magnetic stripe was not feasible. Instead, we ended up employing user names, passwords, and payment encryption. Payment encryption, which secures sensitive financial information during online transactions, offers a crucial layer of protection. The user name – a unique identifier, and the password, a secret, support the identification of the person using the browser or connected device, from somewhere out there.

If we could each create and remember complex secrets, these cumbersome things call passwords. And, more importantly, never share them with nefarious individuals seeking to take advantage of our naiveté. All would be at peace in the world of security and convenience. The problem is expecting you and I to remember the myriad of complex passwords and not get tricked into sharing our secrets.

Is there an answer, I believe so and at Money 2020 October 25 we will be discussing this very topic. Wednesday Morning at 8:30 in the Titian room at The Venetian in Las Vegas on Level 2, join us as we discuss Identity is Fundamental: What You Need to Know About Identity & The Future of Money.

European ATM Skimming Fraud Jumps 43%

Reported by Epaynews.com

May 08 2008 : In 2007, ATM fraud losses rose by 43 percent in Europe to €439.01 million (US$683.7 million) from €306.48 million in 2006, reports EAST (the European ATM Security Team). Most of the losses in 2006 and 2007 were due to card-skimming at ATMs, the non-profit organization says.The year-on-year increase in fraud losses was mainly due to a €173.6 million increase in cross-border losses in 2007.

“These (cross-border) losses are occurring globally in countries where all or part of the ATMs deployed are not yet EMV-compliant,” EAST says. “Domestic European fraud losses have fallen year on year, an indication that the roll out of EMV-compliant ATMs is driving down fraud.”

According to EAST, 78 percent of European ATMs are now EMV-compliant.

Card fraudsters are being forced to seek out non-EMV compliant ATMs to obtain cash, EAST says. “Incidents continue to be reported where data skimmed from EMV cards in European countries where ATMs are EMV-compliant, has been sent by criminals to European countries where ATMs are not fully EMV-compliant,” it says.

The skimmed data is used to make counterfeit cards that enable fraudsters to illegally withdraw cash from ATMs.

According to EAST, skimmed data is also increasingly being sent to countries in and outside Europe where EMV cards can be used as magnetic-stripe cards in ATMs. This takes advantage of a process known as “mag-stripe fallback”, which is designed to ensure that a card can be used even if its EMV chip is damaged or faulty.

Crooks Have Your Card and You Don’t Even Know It

How Thieves Copy Credit and Debit Cards and Drain Accounts

By ELISABETH LEAMY – ABC News

May 2, 2008—

While your ATM card is tucked in your wallet, thieves half a world away could be cloning it and using it. The crime is called “white card fraud,” and ABC News investigated just how easy it is for thieves to make a copy of your card and use it to drain your account.

It’s difficult to get an exact figure, but it’s estimated that identity thieves net an estimated $345 million this way every year. Gary Burkey of Wilmington, Del., discovered somebody was withdrawing money from his account at ATM machines in a part of Pennsylvania he had never even visited.

Criminals get people’s numbers in a variety of ways. One way they capture card numbers is by installing skimmer devices over the slot where you insert your card when you use an ATM.

They also use hidden cameras to record your PIN. Miami Beach police have actual footage from a crook’s camera in Florida that shows a victim inputting his PIN. Clear as day: 1-4-2-6.

Click here for tips to protect you from today’s modern identity thieves.

“What makes this really sneaky, really devious, is once the criminals get the account information, they wait on it for a little while, said Cpl. Jeff Whitmarsh of the Delaware State Police. They replicate the cards and when the consumer least expects, that’s when they go in and hit the account.”

ABC News found the machines used to copy cards for sale right on the Internet, even though there are very few legitimate uses for them. We had our choice of 30 machines and bought one for about $500. We were even able to request priority shipping and received the package the next day.

ABC took the device to Chris O’Ferrell, an ethical hacker for a computer company called Command Information, which helps the federal government secure its systems.

We handed over an ABC News credit card and O’Ferrell swiped it so the machine could capture the information on the magnetic strip. Right away, the data popped up on the computer screen: name and account information.

With another swipe, O’Ferrell transferred it to a blank white card that came with our kit. Any card with a magnetic strip can be made into a clone — gift cards, hotel key cards, etc.

In less than five seconds, we had a duplicate credit card.

“That’s it. That’s all there is to it,.” O’Ferrell said.

We cloned an ATM card too. At one point we even accidentally deleted the data on one of our source cards, but since we had a clone, we were able to put the data back on.

Once we had clones of our cards, the question was, would they work? We tried the Visa card out at a gas pump. Without actually making a purchase (we didn’t want to violate any laws) we inserted the card to see if it would get authorized.

When the “lift the handle and begin fueling” message came up, we knew our clone was working. We tested the cloned ATM card by checking our balance at an ATM machine. When the screen read “Hello Elisabeth Leamy,” that was our first clue that that one was working.

It’s a bonanza for crooks. They used to have to risk going into stores to buy pricey merchandise, which they then sold for cash. Now they can just drain ATMs. Authorities say specialized crews do nothing but hit ATMs, cashing out on behalf of other identity thieves and taking a commission. One Bulgarian gang pulled $200,000 out of a single cash machine in Florida.

More than 65 other countries in Europe, Asia and South America now use smart chip technology that makes card cloning almost impossible. But the United States has stayed with magnetic strips to avoid the cost of converting ATMs. By one estimate, we have 400,000 cash machines in this country.

“It’s totally unacceptable,” O’Ferrell said. “It makes it extremely easy for the criminals to clone our cards and steal our identities.” Experts say since U.S. credit and debit cards are so much easier to tap, U.S. cardholders have become targets.